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Brown v. Board of Education:
Right Result, Wrong Reasoning
by Ellis Washington*
I. ABSTRACT
The genesis of this Article was originally conceived as a letter to a
journalist in response to an article I had read in the Detroit News titled,
"Judge Damon Keith, governor hosts fund raiser on Saturday."' I also
heard about this event while listening to National Public Radio that
same day, and I planned on attending because Judge Keith is a great
man and a great civil rights champion. I have always wanted to meet
this Titan in person, however, after further reflection, I decided not to
attend this event on principle. The occasion was in part a fundraiser for
his legal history collection and in part a celebration of the famous Brown
v. Board of Education' Supreme Court decision that mandated that
Black 3 children and White children attend public schools together. In

* DePauw University (B.A., 1983); University of Michigan (M.M., 1986); John Marshall
Law School (J.D., 1994). Editor, University of Michigan Law Review. Law clerk for the
Rutherford Institute. Faculty member, Davenport University. Member, Board of Visitors
at Ave Maria School of Law. Lecturer, Michigan area schools, universities, and law
schools, specializing in the history of law, legal and political philosophy, jurisprudence,
constitutional law, critical race theory, and legal feminist theory. Publications: THE DEVIL
IS IN THE DETAILS: ESSAYS ON LAW, RACE, POLITICS AND RELIGION (1999); BEYOND THE
VEIL: ESSAYS IN THE DIALECTICAL STYLE OF SOCRATES (2002, 2004); THE INSEPARABILITY
OF LAW AND MORALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, NATURAL LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW (2002);
The Nuremberg Trials: The Death of the Rule of Law (In InternationalLaw), 49 LOYOLA
L. REV. 471-518 (2003).
1. Kimberly Hayes Taylor, Judge Damon Keith, GovernorHost Fundraiseron Saturday,
DETROIT NEWS, May 16, 2003. My original essay letter was sent to this Detroit News
reporter regarding an article that she had written on May 16, 2003, but the Editor of the
Detroit News denied publication because, in his words, "the letter was too long."
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. As is my custom with all of my writings, throughout this Article, all racial
designations will be capitalized. See ELLIS WASHINGTON, THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS:
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this Article, which memorializes the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown
opinion, I take a bold and contrarian's position. The position categorically holds to the supposition that while the Brown opinion did some
"symbolic" good in starting America on the road to removing "separate
but equal" public facilities segregated by race, because the Court in
Brown relied on sophistic political, sociological, and psychological
considerations rather than on sound constitutional, legal, and moral
grounds, the fallout from Brown did infinitely more to harm the
"educational opportunities" of Black people than it did to help
them-deconstructing quality educational access for Black children for
generations-even until this day.
In the words of Thomas Jefferson, "[t]o consider the judges as the
ultimate arbitersof all constitutionalquestions... would place us under
the despotism of an oligarchy."' During this fiftieth anniversary year
of Brown v. Board of Education, arguably one of the most well-known
cases of the twentieth century, I do not join the chorus of jurists, judges,
justices, educators, academics, civil-rights activists, and laymen of good
will in celebration of this most pivotal decision because I find little in the
Brown decision to celebrate. Why? For the same reason Frederick
Douglass did not celebrate America's seventy-fifth anniversary year in
1852.' As a law scholar, writer, and lecturer, I have studied this

ESSAYS ON LAW, RACE, POLITICS AND RELIGION (1999) [hereinafter WASHINGTON, THE

DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS]. In chapter one of this opus titled-"black"or "Black":A Pleafor

Legitimacy in Legal Scholarship, the Author cited the words of feminist legal philosopher,
Catherine MacKinnon, who is a professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School.
MacKinnon writes: "[Black should not be regarded] as merely a color of skin pigmentation,
but as a heritage, an experience, a cultural and personal identity." The Author further
writes in the opening paragraph of this opus:
The subject of legitimizing Black Americans in print generally and in legal
scholarship specifically, by utilizing the uppercase, is not without precedent. This
grammatical jot has tremendous implications in aiding or hindering the African
American in their search for equal treatment under the law by removing from
them this second-class treatment of their race in print. Therefore, the thesis of
this Essay is an earnest plea to the legal scholarship community to lead the way
by no longer referring to African Americans in print as black, in the lowercase, but
as Black, a capitalized proper noun.
WASHINGTON, THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS, at 3.
4.

ALBERT

J.

BEVERIDGE,

III,

THE

LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL:

CONSTRUCTION 1800-1815, 101, 144 n.3 (1980).

CONFLICT AND

Thomas Jefferson, America's third

president, stated these sentiments regarding the first example of judicial activism by the
Court in Marbury v.Madison (1803).

5. Frederick Douglass (1817?-1895), that great American who was also a former slave,
orator, abolitionist, newspaper publisher, writer, and uncompromising foe of slavery, spoke
on July 5, 1852, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the American Declaration of Independence.
The occasion was a meeting sponsored by the Rochester Ladies' Anti-Slavery Society,
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opinion in great detail for many years, and even more importantly, I
have studied the philosophical and the sociological suppositions, the
politics, and the educational theoretical assumptions, as well as the
constitutional law and legal history behind this decision and have come
to the following conclusions about this famous case.
A. There Is Not A Single JudicialPrecedent in the Entire Brown
Opinion
Although the Court in its opinion expressly overruled the "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,' as well as a series of ancillary
cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma7 and Sweatt v. Painter,s there was no

Rochester Hall, Rochester, N.Y. To illustrate the full shame of slavery, Douglass delivered
a speech that took aim at the pieties of the nation-the cherished memories of its
revolution, its principles of liberty, and its moral and religious foundation. The Fourth of
July, a day celebrating freedom, was used by Douglass to remind his audience of liberty's
unfinished business. Douglass spoke:
What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July? I answer: a day that reveals
to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to
which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted
liberty, an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds
of rejoicing are empty and heartless; your denunciations of tyrants, brass fronted
impudence; your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery; your prayers and
hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your religious parade, and
solemnity, are, to him, mere bombast, fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy-a
thin veil to cover up crimes, which would disgrace a nation of savages. There is
not a nation on the earth guilty of practices, more shocking and bloody, than are
the people of these United States, at this very hour ....
Go where you may, search where you will, roam through all the monarchies and
despotisms of the old world, travel through South America, search out every
abuse, and when you have found the last, lay your facts by the side of the
everyday practices of this nation, and you will say with me, that, for revolting
barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a rival ...
See Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? at www.douglassarchives

.org/doug-alO.htm.
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Court established that the doctrine of
"separate but equal" public facilities can be constitutionally sustained on racial grounds).
One of the primary things Brown did was to state unequivocally: "The 'separate but equal'
doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, has no place in the field of public education." See
Brown, 347 U.S. at 483-84 (emphasis added).
7. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Court ruled inequality
was discovered at a graduate school where specific benefits enjoyed by White students were
denied to Black students of similar educational qualifications).
8. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Court ruled that a makeshift law school
created by the state of Texas to avoid admitting Blacks into the University of Texas Law
School did not come anywhere close to being equal). Other cases that included the
"separate but equal" doctrine that was overruled by the Court in Brown were: Cumming
v. County Bd. of Educ. of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275
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reliance by the Court on actual, verifiable, legitimate constitutional
precedent (i.e., stare decisis). The segregation cases that the Court in
Brown categorically overruled were designed to show that separate
educational facilities did not meet the equality standard of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.? In other words, the
Court in Brown made up the suppositions underlying the decision in
Brown out of whole cloth. There is no precedent or judicial foundation
to be found throughout the entire Brown opinion. The Court on May 17,
1954, in a unanimous opinion, held that from that day forward, the
Equal Protection Clause would be interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to ensure that Black children had equal access to public
educational facilities by judicial fiat.10
B. The Brown Opinion Was Based on the PoliticalPressuresof the
Day
Although conventional wisdom regarding Brown's impact on society
categorically holds that the decision in Brown greatly improved the
educational opportunities for Black people and for Americans, in modern
times it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Court in Brown
based its opinion on criteria other than the Constitution, stare decisis,
or the rule of law. The Court did not form its opinion on universal
principles like the rule of law, natural law, morality, equality, justice,
and truth. For example one anonymous commentator wrote:
There is no question that the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education,
which struck down racially enforced school segregation, is one of the
most important in American history. No nation committed to
democracy could hope to achieve those ideals while keeping people of
color in a legally imposed position of inferiority. But the decision also
raised a number of questions about the authority of the Court and
whether this opinion represents a judicial activism that, despite its
inherently moral and democratic ruling, is nonetheless an abuse of
judicial authority.11
Brown v. Board of Education did not bring an end to segregation in
other areas such as private schools, colleges, universities, law schools,
restaurants, and restrooms, nor did it mandate the desegregation of
public schools by a specific time. It did, however, pronounce as

U.S. 78 (1927); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Oklahoma,
332 U.S. 631 (1948).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

10. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
11.

See http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/36.htm (emphasis added).
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unconstitutional, liberal or de jure racial segregation, which then existed
in twenty-one states. This was an enormous step toward comprehensive
desegregation of public schools. Even partial desegregation of these
schools, however, was years away.
C. The Brown Opinion Was Based on Flawed and Hyperbolic Social
Science Rather Than on Legitimate Constitutional Jurisprudence
The Court, in drafting its opinion in Brown, relied heavily on several
political, sociological, and psychological philosophies that were not
expressly mentioned.12 Nevertheless, the Court strongly relied upon
the suppositions of these most diabolical philosophies, namely:
[Hiumanism (man is the center of all things), secularism (there is no
God but man and the state), radical liberalism (freedom without
morality or conscience), positive law and legal positivism (separation

of legality and morality), relativism (moral equivalence of all things, or
the idea that no person, place, or thing is superior to another),
egalitarianism(the equality of results rather than opportunities), and
individualism (the severe reduction of restraints to pleasure). 3
The Court also cited what later proved to be the flawed scientific
research of Dr. Kenneth Clark and Dr. Mamie Phipps Clark, the famous
Black sociologist team that studied at Howard and received their Ph.D
degrees from Columbia University.14 Their studies centered on color
and how Black children identified White dolls as the prettiest, evidencing self-hatred in the Black community due to America's history of racial
discrimination.' 5 Their research on color and dolls was critical in

12. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
13. Ellis Washington, The Nuremberg Trials: The Death of the Rule of Law (In
InternationalLaw), 49 LOYOLA L. REV. 471, 492 (2003).
14. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.ll.
15. ROBERT V. GuTHRIE, EVEN THE RAT WAS WHITE: A HISTORICAL VIEW OF
PSYCHOLOGY (2nd ed. 1998); MAMIE PHIPPS CLARK (n.d.), available at http://www.arches.
uga.edu/-acrobert/; WINNI WARREN, BLACK WOMEN SCIENTISTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1999); Mamie Phipps Clark & Joel S. Karp, A Report On A Summer Remedial Program,
61 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 137-42 (1961); Kenneth & Mamie Phipps Clark, The Development

of Consciousnessof Self in Negro Pre-schoolChildren,ARCHIVES PSYCHOL. (1939); Kenneth
& Mamie Phipps Clark, The Development of Consciousness of Self and the Emergence of
Racial Identification in Negro Preschool Children, 10 J. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 591-99 (1939);

Kenneth & Mamie Phipps Clark, Segregationas a Factor in the Racial Identification of
Negro Pre.school Children, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 161-65 (1940); Kenneth & Mamie

Phipps Clark, Skin Color as a Factorin Racial Identificationof Negro Preschool Children,
11 J. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 159-69 (1947); Kenneth & Mamie Phipps Clark, Emotional Factors

in Racial Identificationand Preference in Negro Children, 19 NEGRO EDUC. 506-13 (1950).
It was the Clarks' work in the 1940s and 1950s that NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall
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persuading the Court to adopt the then radical public policy remedy of
racially integrating America's public schools.
D. The Jurisprudenceof the Brown Opinion Was Founded on Purely
Positive Law Grounds
The Court refused to consider the innate, intrinsic, and God-ordained
humanity Black people had in common with White people and all of
humanity, because the legal philosophy underlying the Brown opinion
was thoroughly based on positive law and egalitarian philosophy." In
positive law jurisprudence (secular, man-made law), justices, judges,
philosophers, academics, and lawyers, who held views on legal philosophy, conscientiously separated law from moral and religious considerations. This legal philosophy was the controlling jurisprudence relied
upon in drafting the Brown opinion. Since positive law and legal
positivism had been the dominant legal philosophy since the early 1900s,
the court relied on those theories rather than relying on the previous
jurisprudence of natural law, which was integrated out of the JudeoChristian tradition, or on constitutional law and morals grounds,
particularly the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, 7 the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause," and the Equal
Protection Clause,"9 although the Court did partially rely on the Equal
Protection Clause2 ° in its Brown opinion.
Furthermore, positive law jurisprudence has not only decimated the
moral presumptions and confidence that the American people traditionally had in the rule of law, but positive law jurisprudence was also
shown not to work for the Allied powers against the twenty-four Nazi
leaders during the Nuremberg Trials from 1946 to 1948.21 Finally,
positive law jurisprudence did not help Black people, by and large, to
obtain better educational opportunities as promised by the Court in
Brown.

and others included in their appellate brief on Brown that the Court heavily relied on
regarding the sociological considerations of segregation on affecting the learning
capabilities of Black children in school and in society.
16. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
19. Id.
20. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
21. One hundred twelve years after Austin's work on positive law was published,
defense attorneys for the Nazi defendants in the Nuremberg Trials so effectively utilized
Austin's command and superior orders doctrines as to win the freedom for thirty percent
of the defendants from the hangman's noose. The Judgment at Nuremberg, 6 F.R.D. 69.
See Washington, supra note 13, at 480.
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E. The Court Refused to Utilize Any of the Abolitionist's
Arguments Against the Evils of Racial Segregation
Until the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court followed societal
These
presumptions on an integration of legality and morality.
presumptions were both impliedly and overtly expressed in many of the
Supreme Court opinions dealing with issues of morality, religion, and
the elements of a civilized society. Since its earliest decisions, the
Supreme Court had formulated its ideas on morality, liberty, justice, and
equality. The Court affirmed the dignity of all God's creations; that all
people had certain, basic natural rights that were guaranteed to them
by their very humanity-an inalienable or natural right that transcends
the mere laws of man. In the context of Brown, these inalienable rights
should extend to Black people. On this point Neomi Rao stated:
In the nineteenth century, Supreme Court decisions quoted philosophers at greater length than more contemporary opinions, but virtually
all references were to Montesquieu, whose L'Esprit des Loix (The Spirit
of Laws) was repeatedly cited for propositions of limited government,
balance of powers, and the need for virtuous citizens. As the nineteenth century was a time when the fundamental principles of
American government were still being affirmed and fully articulated,
the Court's reference to such thinkers seems natural and appropriate,
especially because many references were to the principles of separation
of powers and the institutional limits of the Court.22
The Court thought that the abolitionist's reasoning about Black
people being equal to White people on natural law, moral, religious, or
humanitarian grounds to be, at best, provincial and unsophisticated; at
worst, fanatical, medieval, and hyper-religious.
The tragedy of Brown is not what it did, but what it did not do. How
exceedingly more enduring and sublime would the decision in Brown
have been to Black people, to their dreams of full equality in America,
to the history of American law, to American society, had the Court
acknowledged Black people's God-ordained morality, dignity, and
humanity as the abolitionists did against the evils and gross immorality
of slavery a century before.2"

22. Neomi Rao, Comment: A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Philosophers by
the Supreme Court, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1376 (1998).
23. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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F The Court Used Humanistic and New Age Language in Drafting
Its Opinion
The Court in Brown had an obvious and enduring bias against
integrating legality and morality, and since it had long ago dispensed
with the natural law jurisprudence out of the Judeo-Christian tradition
of earlier Court opinions, the Court in Brown was left with the
prevailing paternalistic and academic discourses and sophistic philosophies of the times-humanism, egalitarianism, materialism, secularism,
and positivism. Therefore, the Court, in formulating the logic behind its
opinion, used humanistic and New Age language to hold that racial
segregation in American education must end because to keep schools
segregated based on race would "hurt the feelings" of "Negroes" and their
"self-esteem" and "educational success" would be hindered.24 In two
telling passages, the Court quoted from the researcher's brief, which was
included in the arguments the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People ("NAACP") presented to the Court.2 5 In one passage
the Court quoted: "[t]o separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."26
In another passage from the Brown opinion, the Court further
explained the legal reasoning and logic behind its decision:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard]the educational and mental development of Negro children and
to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[lyl
integrated school system."
Allow me to sarcastically surmise that "self-esteem" was why Black
people, for over 250 years, suffered back-breaking work, torture,
lynchings, and horrifying living conditions. Additionally, am I to
surmise that hundreds of thousands of people, black and white, were
killed in the Civil War that ended slavery in an attempt to avoid

24. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
25. Id. at 494.
26.
27.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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"feelings of inferiority," to avoid "retard[ing] the educational and mental
development of negro children,"2 8 and to avoid "denoting the inferiority
of the negro group?"29 Finally, was improving "their status in the
community" and going to school with White children in an "integrated"
school system why millions of Black people suffered for another hundred
years after slavery ended under the bondage of Jim Crow segregation,
the fire hoses, the dogs, the fire bombings, the Ku Klux Klan, the
political officials sworn to protect all Americans, the fiery crosses in the
middle of the night, and the constant fear of White racist terrorism all
so that Black people's "feelings of inferiority," "self esteem," and "their
status in the community" would not be adversely affected by being
mandated to attend all Black schools? This is beyond the pale!
Bluntly speaking, this type of pop psychology masquerading as legal
reasoning used by the Court in the 1954 Brown decision was as
fraudulent then as it is fraudulent now, fifty years later. The opinion
lacks legitimate judicial precedent, a valid historical context, or
plausible constitutional foundation. To fully understand Brown's impact
on American society and its denigration and devastation on the
education and educational opportunities of Black people, it is of critical
importance to understand the legal, political, social, and historical
origins of racism in America, particularly in education.
The Brown opinion forever created the idea that Black people are not
equal to White people based on the moral suppositions of the Constitution. Many of the most noted jurists who passionately and eloquently
argued against racial segregation in the Brown case were witting or
unwitting participants in the deconstruction of educational opportunities
of their own race. People like civil rights attorneys Robert L. Carter,
Thurgood Marshall, Constance Baker Motley, Spottswood W. Robinson,
III, and groups like the NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), American Federation of Teachers ("AFT"), and many others,
who sincerely, but erroneously, believed the sophistic logic of Brown and
its supposed positive impact on securing equal access to public education
and positive educational opportunities for Black people in America, all
eloquently argued against racial segregation to the Court in Brown.
Now, fifty years after Brown, I am sad to report that the educational
egalitarianism of Brown, with its exalted promises of educational utopia
on a fundamental level, has not happened for Black people in America.
More poignantly, the promises of Brown could not, can not, and will not
happen for Black people in America because the Supreme Court based
the Brown opinion upon a host of flawed and spurious jurisprudence,

28.
29.

Id.
Id.
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and foremost among them is the presupposition in legal philosophy and
constitutional law that holds to an intractable separation between law
and morality.3 °
The entire opinion in Brown should have been one, perhaps two
paragraphs long. All the Court needed to do was rely on the explicit text
of the Constitution that all nine members of the Supreme Court are
sworn to uphold by risk of impeachment. Particularly, The Declaration
of Independence pronounces---"We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights. . . Life, Liberty and the pursuit
Furthermore, it has been settled Supreme
of Happiness."31
Court precedent for almost 100 years that all American citizens,
including Black people, have a "liberty interest" in education and
earning a living.32 The Thirteenth Amendment's Anti-slavery Clause
ended the savage practice of one man owning another man as property.33 The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities and
Equal Protection Clause state that "[n]o State shall ... abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States [or of] life,

30. See Author's comments on the history of positive law jurisprudence in American
constitutional law and its influence on the Supreme Court and the ascendancy of positive
law jurisprudence in the early twentieth century, which eventually replaced the former
natural law jurisprudence in judicial opinion and legal philosophy. WASHINGTON, supra
note 3.
31. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (exposing a natural law
philosophy).
32. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Troxel v. Granville, eloquently traces
the history of this "liberty interest" in education and parenthood thusly:
The liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923), we held that the "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and
bring up children" and "to control the education of their own." Two years later,
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), we again held that the
"liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control." We explained in Piercethat "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations." Id. at 535. We returned to the subject in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a
constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 166.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny ...the equal
protection of the laws."34 The Fifteenth Amendment's "right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."35 Instead of relying on the Constitution, the
Court in Brown capitulated to the strong political pressures of the times,
compromised, and unwisely relied on flawed and hyperbolic socialscience
in a legal case that would cripple the education and lives of millions of
Black children for generations to come, even until this day.3"
Furthermore, the Court refused to follow the common sense, moral
precepts of the Constitution, and chose not to follow the Judeo-Christian
tradition that President John Quincy Adams 37 used, along with
Abraham Lincoln, Hariette Tubman, Frederick Douglass, John Brown,
and William Lloyd Garrison,35 -proven strategies that all of these great
abolitionists used to end slavery in the 1860s. The Court also refused
to consider the life's work and writings of such civil rights giants
as 3 9-Booker T. Washington, Ida B. Wells, James Farmer, Paul
Robeson, Rosa Parks, and Dr. Martin Luther King, who so eloquently
and passionately stated in his dying plea to his countrymen "All we say
to America is, Be true to what you [wrote] on paper."" All of these

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
36. See http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/36.htm.
37. Regarding the illustrious career of John Quincy Adams, the sixth U.S. President,
Congressman, and "the Hell-hound of slavery" in his fight against the evils of slavery. He
literally died for the cause while making a speech on the floor of Congress.
38. See supra note 23 on the Abolitionist movement in America.
39. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
40. The day before he was assassinated, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered the
speech, I've Been To The Mountain Top, in support of the striking sanitation workers. King
stated:
Now we've got to go on to Memphis just like that. I call upon you to be with us
Monday. Now about injunctions: We have an injunction and we're going into court
tomorrow morning to fight this illegal, unconstitutional injunction. All we say to
America is, "Be true to what you said on paper." If I lived in China or even Russia,
or any totalitarian country, maybe I could understand the denial of certain basic
First Amendment privileges, because they hadn't committed themselves to that
over there. But somewhere I read of the freedom of assembly. Somewhere I read
of the freedom of speech. Somewhere I read of the freedom of the press.
Somewhere I read that the greatness of America is the right to protest for right.
And so just as I say, we aren't going to let any injunction turn us around. We are
going on.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I've Been To The Mountain Top, Address Before the striking
sanitation workers at Mason Temple in Memphis, Tennessee (Apr. 3, 1968), available at
http://www.afscme.org/about/kingspch.htm (emphasis added).
34.
35.
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great Black leaders tried to affirm Black people in moral terms, as
creations of God, thus deserving dignity and access to the same equal
rights, privileges, and responsibilities of White people, not to be viewed
in the implied language of Brown as perpetually pathetic, inferior,
ignorant, dependent people that needed the cold, capricious benevolence
of White paternalism.
With all due respect to Judge Damon Keith, a jurist of the highest
order, the gala event that occurred in Detroit on May 17, 2003,
41
was indeed a terrible
celebrating Brown v. Board of Education,
tragedy, not because I do not believe that Black people should be allowed
to attend school with Whites. I am a Black man, born and raised in
Detroit, and a product of the Brown v. Board of Education experiment
on my people. I have attended Detroit public schools with White
children from kindergarten through law school and post-graduate school;
however, to celebrate a court case such as Brown, which is obviously not
based on a single judicial precedent, diminishes the Constitution that all
Americans should put their faith in to uphold the rule of law, justice,
liberty, freedom, reason, morality, and Veritas (Truth). With this said,
the question then becomes: how could the Court in Brown in good
conscience on the one hand, denigrate, pervert, and rationalize the
Constitution to serve what I, and most reasonable people, would consider
a noble and just cause allowing Black children to attend White public
schools on equal protection grounds, to then turn around and use that
same Constitution to protect, defend, and support the flawed and racist
suppositions that undergird and justified this case, which were ratified
into law in the Brown opinion fifty years ago? This indeed is a most
untenable position for any rational person to try to defend.
The Faustian bargain42 the Justices of United States Supreme Court
made in 1954, along with the Congress, the Senate, the President, as

41. See supra text accompanying note 1.
42. In my article on the Nuremberg Trials, I returned to my original music and literary
roots by making reference to one of the truly great masterpieces of literture, Goethe's
Faust:
By 1945, twelve years after Adolph Hitler boasted that his Third Reich would
endure for a millennium, Berlin and all of Germany was a smoldering heap of
twisted metal, destroyed buildings, and ashes intermingled with a multitude of
disfigured corpses. Hitler and most of his generals were killed, captured, or in
hiding. The lessons here are demonstrable-one should never sacrifice moral
principles for political expediency and economic gain; to do so is to engage in the
folly of Goethe's Faust who sold his soul to the devil for a promise to be young
again, only to be tricked by that same devil, ruining his life and that of many
others.
See JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST (David Luke, ed. & trans., Oxford World
Classic 1998) (1808). Cited also in Washington, supra note 13, at 486.
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well as every court in America, every political leader, every public school,
private school, law school, university, academy, and every responsible
American citizen has made since then by giving legitimacy to Brown
v. Board of Education, is to sacrifice lawful constitutional due process
and sound constitutional jurisprudence for the expediency of the public
policy fiction the Brown opinion solidified in American culture, that
Black children must be allowed to attend public school with White
children for them to get equally educated, or to have equal access to a
quality education in equal educational facilities.
This type of misguided public policy presupposes that Black people,
prior to 1954, were totally uneducated, ignorant, and just waiting for the
opportunity to finally get educated by going to school with White people.
The hateful assumptions Brown makes about Black people should be
publicly denounced by all rational persons of any race, class, or creed,
but alas, I am sad to report that the only sound besides my voice crying
out in the wilderness for reason regarding Brown, is their (i.e., the
Judiciary, Congress, the academy, the legal community, the civil rights
activists, and the race merchants), silence of the lambs.

